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INTRODUCTION
In 2017, media attention focused on sexual harassment as victims
reported harassment and assault as part of the #MeToo movement. Although
many of the accounts focused on sexualized treatment, this treatment often
occurred within a broader context of unequal treatment, such as pay
inequality and the disproportionately low promotion rate of women into
leadership positions. For decades, legal scholars have noted the interplay
between broader work constructs and harassment.1
*

Judge Joseph P. Kinneary Professor, University of Cincinnati College of Law.
1. Vicki Schultz, Reconceptualizing Sexual Harassment, 107 YALE L.J. 1683 (1993)
[hereinafter Schultz, Reconceptualizing Sexual Harassment]; see also Martha
Chamallas, Structuralist and Cultural Domination Theories Meet Title VII: Some
Contemporary Influences, 92 MICH. L. REV. 2370 (1994); Tristin K. Green, Discrimination in
Workplace Dynamics: Toward a Structural Account of Disparate Treatment
Theory, 38 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 91 (2003) [hereinafter Green, “Workplace Dynamics”];
Tristin K. Green, Work Culture and Discrimination, 93 CALIF. L. REV. 623 (2005); Joanna L.
Grossman, Moving Forward, Looking Back: A Retrospective on Sexual Harassment Law, 95
B.U. L. REV. 1029 (2015); Vicki Schultz, Open Statement on Sexual Harassment from
Employment Discrimination Law Scholars, 71 STAN. L. REV. ONLINE 17 (2018); Susan
Sturm, Second Generation Employment Discrimination: A Structural Approach, 101 COLUM.
L. REV. 458 (2001).
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When combined, stories and scholarship offer a powerful critique of
the way many judges and practitioners currently conceive of harassment: as
a separate, stand-alone “claim” under Title VII. When the Supreme Court
first recognized harassment in the mid-1980s, it created frameworks for
harassment cases that seemed to separate harassment from other types of
disparate treatment. It also tended to separate various categories of
harassment, labeling harassment with words such as “quid pro quo” or
“hostile work environment.”2 Hostile-work-environment cases often focus
on whether the alleged conduct was unwelcome, whether it was “severe or
pervasive,” and whether it objectively and subjectively altered the work
environment of the plaintiff.3
In contrast, when a plaintiff files other types of disparate-treatment
cases, the courts use different analytical frameworks. For example, if a
plaintiff alleges single-motive disparate treatment based on circumstantial
evidence, courts usually analyze the case under the three-part, burdenshifting framework developed in McDonnell Douglas v. Green.4
This Article argues that viewing harassment as a separate, standalone claim likely misinterprets Title VII and the Supreme Court’s
jurisprudence surrounding harassment. Unfortunately, this error represents
the dominant view among federal appellate and district courts and has
profound consequences for the reach of harassment law.
This Article argues that harassment is not, and never was, intended
to be a separate claim under Title VII.5 It does so by showing that the history
of discrimination law is plagued with procedural ambiguity. The Supreme
Court has regularly used civil-procedure words like “proof,” “burden,” and
“claim” inartfully.6 This inexact use has resulted in decades of confusion.7
2. See, e.g., Burlington Indus., Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742, 752 (1998).
3. See, e.g., Fuller v. Idaho Dep’t of Corr., 865 F.3d 1154, 1174 (9th Cir. 2017).
4. See, e.g., Young v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., 135 S.Ct. 1338, 1354 (2015); Tex.
Dep’t of Cmty. Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 252–53 (1981).
5. This Article focuses on sexual harassment and thus Title VII. However, the
arguments made in this Article would also apply in other contexts, such as the Age
Discrimination in Employment Act and the Americans with Disabilities Act.
6. See, e.g., Univ. of Tex. Sw. Med. Ctr. v. Nassar, 570 U.S. 338, 339 (2013) (“Title
VII retaliation claims must be proved according to traditional principles of but-for
causation. . . . “) (emphasis added); Gross v. FBL Fin. Servs., Inc., 557 U.S. 167, 177 (2009)
(quoting Schaffer v. Weast, 546 U.S. 49, 56 (2005)) (“Where the statutory text is ‘silent on
the allocation of the burden of persuasion,’ we ‘begin with the ordinary default rule that
plaintiffs bear the risk of failing to prove their claims.’”) (emphasis added); cf. Richard J.
Lazarus, The (Non)Finality of Supreme Court Opinions, 128 HARV. L. REV. 540, 564 (2014)
(exposing the commonality of “errors involv[ing] precision in word choice” in Supreme Court
opinions based partly on “sharply contrasting views on the proper definition of some words
and even their existence”).
7. See, e.g., Green, Workplace Dynamics, supra note 1, at 151 (discussing “confusion
surrounding claims alleging system-wide discriminatory bias operating through decentralized,
highly subjective decisionmaking processes”); Grossman, supra note 1, at 1035 (discussing
how “[t]he Meritor Court . . . cemented confusion over the proper standard for employer
liability”); Sandra F. Sperino, Rethinking Discrimination Law, 110 MICH. L. REV. 69, 120
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In several instances, the Supreme Court has stepped in to clear up the
procedural confusion.8
When doing so, it often interprets federal
discrimination law in ways that are procedurally distinct from the dominant
paradigm existing at the time. This Article provides an overview of a number
of instances in which the Supreme Court has done this. Harassment law is
equally due for the same procedural clarification. Consistent with current
Supreme Court jurisprudence, courts can and should clarify that harassment
is not a stand-alone claim.
This jurisprudential transition would have profound procedural,
substantive, and theoretical implications. It affects what a plaintiff must
plead to survive a motion to dismiss. In addition, it affects whether a judge
can issue jury instructions related to harassment if a plaintiff does not directly
allege harassment in a complaint. On the substantive and theoretical levels,
it affects how courts and litigants view harassment’s connection to other
types of facts supporting discrimination. Viewing harassment as a Title VII
claim, rather than a stand-alone harassment claim, also affects whether and
how courts will apply 42 U.S.C. § 2000e–2(a)(2) to harassment facts.
This Article proceeds as follows: Section I describes Title VII’s
statutory language and the main Supreme Court cases addressing harassment
law. This section focuses on the way the Supreme Court uses words like
“claim” and “theory” to describe harassment and shows how these words
could cause courts and litigants to be confused about what harassment
doctrine is. Section II discusses the procedural, substantive, and theoretical
consequences that stem from perceiving harassment as a separate claim under
Title VII. In Section III, this Article examines other instances in which the
Supreme Court has issued decisions that are procedurally ambiguous. As a
direct result, the lower courts and litigants then developed a dominant
understanding about the procedural implications of the ambiguity. In later
cases, the Supreme Court has returned to these earlier cases and interpreted
them in ways that often contest the dominant procedural paradigm. Section
IV explores how this same shift can and should occur in harassment law.
I.

BACKGROUND

Title VII is the cornerstone federal employment discrimination
statute. Title VII prohibits an employer from discriminating against a worker
on the basis of race, sex, national origin, color, or religion.9 Title VII’s main
operative provision consists of two subparts. Under the first subpart, it is an
unlawful employment practice for an employer to do the following:

(2011) (“Even assuming that some confusion would be generated by a lack of guidance, the
Supreme Court’s frameworks have generated quite a few problems on their own.”).
8. Nassar, 570 U.S. at 355; Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N. A., 534 U.S. 506, 509–10
(2002).
9. 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e-2(a) (West 2012).
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(1) to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or
otherwise to discriminate against any individual with respect
to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of
employment, because of such individual’s race, color,
religion, sex, or national origin[.]10
Under Title VII’s second subpart, it is unlawful for an employer to
do the following:
(2) to limit, segregate, or classify his employees or
applicants for employment in any way which would deprive
or tend to deprive any individual of employment
opportunities or otherwise adversely affect his status as an
employee, because of such individual’s race, color, religion,
sex, or national origin.11
These two subparts form the foundation of Title VII’s text.12 The
field of employment discrimination is laden with proof structures. The
federal courts have developed an elaborate system of analytical frameworks
through which courts evaluate cases alleging employment discrimination.13
The Supreme Court first recognized that plaintiffs can prevail under
Title VII if they face harassment (or a hostile work environment) in Meritor
Savings Bank v. Vinson.14 In Meritor, the Supreme Court started its analysis
by quoting the language of 42 U.S.C. § 2000e–2(a)(1).15 This reference is
important for two reasons. First, it means that the Court derived the statutory
authority for harassment from the main operative provision of Title VII.
Harassment is not a different claim, separately stated within Title VII.
Rather, it is part of the same provision from which most of the other theories
of discrimination derive.
Second, as discussed in more detail below, it means that the courts
have not fully articulated the possible scope of harassment. Title VII’s main
operative provision has two subparts, and the Supreme Court has yet to
consider how harassment would proceed under the second subpart.

10. Id. at § 2000e-2(a)(1).
11. Id. at § 2000e-2(a)(2).
12. As stated earlier, Congress amended Title VII in 1991. However, this does not
change the fact that the foundational text of Title VII is contained in 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e2(a) (West 2012).
13. See generally Sperino, supra note 7. Fully describing each framework is not
necessary for this Article. However, by way of example, the courts have developed different
frameworks to analyze cases involving direct evidence, circumstantial evidence of singlemotive disparate treatment, circumstantial evidence of mixed-motive under Title VII, pattern
or practice, and disparate impact.
14. Meritor Sav. Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 73 (1986).
15. Id. at 63.
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In Meritor, the Supreme Court discussed whether the words “terms,
conditions, or privileges of employment” encompass sexual harassment.16
The Court stated, “[t]he phrase ‘terms, conditions, or privileges of
employment’ evinces a congressional intent ‘to strike at the entire spectrum
of disparate treatment of men and women’ in employment.”17 The Court
continued, “we agree, that a plaintiff may establish a violation of Title VII
by proving that discrimination based on sex has created a hostile or abusive
work environment.”18 The Court then stated that harassment affects the
“terms, conditions, or privileges of employment” when it is “sufficiently
severe or pervasive to alter the conditions of the victim’s employment.”19
The textual focus of Meritor is on the words “terms, conditions, or
privileges of employment.” Importantly, the Supreme Court did not purport
to fully define these words.20 Rather, the Supreme Court defined one set of
circumstances under which those terms would be fulfilled.21 In other words,
a severe or pervasive “hostile work environment” is one way for a plaintiff
to establish that she faced discrimination in the terms, conditions, or
privileges of her employment because of a protected trait.22
In Meritor, the Supreme Court did not clearly articulate what it was
creating in a procedural sense. Several parts of the opinion demonstrate that
the Court was not recognizing a new separate cause of action. For example,
the Court cited to the main language of Title VII.23 The case focused on
defining whether harassment could be a type of harm that fell within the
language of 42 U.S.C. § 2000e–2(a)(1).24 The Supreme Court also used the
word “theory” to describe “hostile work environment.”25 Unfortunately, it
also used the word “claim” to describe “hostile work environment.”26
It is vitally important to know what the Court created in Meritor. If
the Supreme Court created a separate “claim” called harassment (or “hostile
work environment”), then Meritor should be read as starting a conversation
about the “elements” of that separate claim. As such, a plaintiff would be
required to prove the elements of this claim to prevail on a harassment claim.
However, a better reading is that Meritor recognized a subset of harm
within the contours of Title VII. Although the differences between these two
descriptions may seem to be mere semantics, Section II demonstrates how
16. Id. at 64.
17. Id. (internal citations omitted).
18. Id. at 66.
19. Id. at 67 (citation omitted).
20. See id. at 63, 65, 70, 72 (discussing the definitions of “sexual harassment” and
“employer,” but not “terms, conditions, or privileges”).
21. See id. at 64 (“unwelcome sexual advances that create an offensive or hostile work
environment”).
22. Id. at 67.
23. Id. at 63.
24. Id.
25. Id. at 68, 71.
26. Id. at 59, 62, 67, 68, 73.
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the choice among these alternatives creates radical differences in the way we
conceive of harassment.
The Supreme Court did not clarify the ambiguity in its next
harassment case, Harris v. Forklift Systems, Inc.27 Notably, in Harris, the
Court did not use the word “claim” to describe harassment as a separate cause
of action. The Court noted:
When the workplace is permeated with “discriminatory
intimidation, ridicule, and insult,” . . . that is “sufficiently
severe or pervasive to alter the conditions of the victim’s
employment and create an abusive working environment,”. .
. Title VII is violated.28
The Supreme Court held that a plaintiff alleging harassment need not
allege psychological injury but would be required to establish that she
subjectively believed the environment to be hostile or abusive and that the
environment would be so viewed by an objective person.29 In making this
latter inquiry, the Court noted:
But we can say that whether an environment is “hostile” or
“abusive” can be determined only by looking at all the
circumstances. These may include the frequency of the
discriminatory conduct; its severity; whether it is physically
threatening or humiliating, or a mere offensive utterance;
and whether it unreasonably interferes with an employee’s
work performance.30
The Court also indicated that the harassing conduct must be unwelcome.31
Just like in Meritor, Harris does not focus on setting up a distinct
cause of action or claim under Title VII. Rather, Harris further clarified

27. Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 21 (1993).
28. Id. (quoting Meritor Sav. Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 67 (1986) (internal brackets
and quotation marks omitted)).
29. Id. at 21–22.
30. Id. at 23. Although there are some variations, courts tend to articulate harassment as
requiring proof that the plaintiff is a member of a protected class, that she was subjected to
unwelcome sexual harassment, that the harassment was based on sex, and that it affected a
term, condition, or privilege of employment. Sandoval v. Am. Bldg. Maint. Indus., Inc., 578
F.3d 787, 801 (8th Cir. 2009). When determining whether harassment affected a term,
condition, or privilege of employment, courts look at both objective and subjective
components, requiring the harassment to be “severe or pervasive enough to create an
objectively hostile or abusive work environment,” as well as requiring the victim to
subjectively perceive the working conditions to be so altered. Id.
31. Harris, 510 U.S. at 21–22 (“Likewise, if the victim does not subjectively perceive
the environment to be abusive, the conduct has not actually altered the conditions of the
victim’s employment, and there is no Title VII violation.”).
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when the harm alleged in a sexual harassment case will be sufficient to meet
the “terms, conditions, or privileges of employment” language of Title VII.
In Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Services., Inc.,32 the Supreme
Court considered whether same-sex sexual harassment could be
discrimination on the basis of sex under Title VII. As with Meritor, the
Supreme Court began its substantive discussion by citing to 42 U.S.C.
§ 2000e–2(a)(1).33 This time, the court focused on what it means to
discriminate against an individual “because of sex.”34 The Court held that a
man can indeed discriminate against another man because of his sex.35
Without explaining the procedural implications, the Supreme Court
used the word “claim” multiple times to describe same-sex sexual
harassment. The Court noted:
Some, like the Fifth Circuit in this case, have held that samesex sexual harassment claims are never cognizable under
Title VII. . . . Other decisions say that such claims are
actionable only if the plaintiff can prove that the harasser is
homosexual (and thus presumably motivated by sexual
desire). . . . We see no justification in the statutory language
or our precedents for a categorical rule excluding same-sex
harassment claims from the coverage of Title VII.36
At the same time, the Court made clear that same-sex sexual
harassment fell under the general umbrella of discrimination provided for in
42 U.S.C. § 2000e–2(a)(1).37
Other major Supreme Court cases discussing harassment deal with
circumstances when an employer will be held liable for such harassment.38
32. Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Servs., Inc., 523 U.S. 75, 78–79 (1998).
33. Id. at 78.
34. Id.
35. Id. at 79.
36. Id. (citing Goluszek v. H.P. Smith, 697 F. Supp. 1452 (N.D. Ill. 1988) (internal
citation omitted)).
37. Id. at 82.
38. See Burlington Indus., Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742, 746–47 (1998); Faragher v. City
of Boca Raton,, 524 U.S. 775, 780 (1998). In these cases, the Supreme Court created a multistep process for determining when an employer will be held liable for harassment. An
employer will be liable for a supervisor’s harassment if it results in a tangible employment
action. Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 762. The Court defined a tangible employment action as “a
significant change in employment status, such as hiring, firing, failing to promote,
reassignment with significantly different responsibilities, or a decision causing a significant
change in benefits.” Id. at 761. If a supervisor engages in harassment that does not result in a
tangible employment action, the employer will be liable for the harassment unless the
employer can establish an affirmative defense. As articulated by the Court, the affirmative
defense has two elements: “(a) that the employer exercised reasonable care to prevent and
correct promptly any sexually harassing behavior, and (b) that the plaintiff employee
unreasonably failed to take advantage of any preventive or corrective opportunities provided
by the employer or to avoid harm otherwise.” Id. at 765.
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These cases reiterate that harassment (or “hostile work environment”) falls
within the larger ambit of a Title VII violation. For example, in Faragher v.
City of Boca Raton, the Court considered whether an employer is liable for
“sexual harassment of subordinates [that] ha[ve] created a hostile work
environment amounting to employment discrimination.”39 Simply put,
harassment is one subset of discrimination harm. In Faragher, the Court
referred to the plaintiff’s claim as a “Title VII claim”40 and noted that its prior
cases discussed the “substantive contours of the hostile environments
forbidden by Title VII.”41
In Burlington Industries, Inc. v. Ellerth, the Court quoted 42 U.S.C.
§ 2000e–2(a)(1) and noted that the text of Title VII does not contain the
words “hostile work environment.”42 Ellerth described Meritor as follows:
“There we considered whether the conduct in question constituted
discrimination in the terms or conditions of employment in violation of Title
VII.”43 The Court continued:
We assumed, and with adequate reason, that if an employer
demanded sexual favors from an employee in return for a job
benefit, discrimination with respect to terms or conditions of
employment was explicit. Less obvious was whether an
employer’s sexually demeaning behavior altered terms or
conditions of employment in violation of Title VII. We
distinguished between quid pro quo claims and hostile
environment claims, see [Meritor], and said both were
cognizable under Title VII, though the latter requires
harassment that is severe or pervasive.44
This part of Ellerth is important because the Court appears to
understand Meritor as recognizing at least two different fact patterns that will
establish harassment liability under Title VII: “quid pro quo” and “hostile
environment.”45 This would suggest that there are at least two, if not more,
evidentiary paths to establishing what the Court called harassment.
However, in Faragher and Ellerth, the Court once again used the word
“claim” when referring to harassment. For example, in Faragher, the Court
noted that “environmental claims are covered by the statute.”46
By looking at the Supreme Court harassment jurisprudence in its
totality, and with an eye toward procedure, a few themes emerge. It is
certainly correct that the Supreme Court has used the word “claim” to
39.
40.
41.
42.
43.
44.
45.
46.

Faragher, 524 U.S. at 780.
Id. at 780, 784.
Id. at 788.
Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 752.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 752–54.
Faragher, 524 U.S. at 786.
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describe harassment. However, in doing so, it has not proclaimed or
described any particular procedural importance to the use of this word. The
cases also show that the Court has repeatedly noted that harassment is a
subset of harm recognized under the language of “terms, conditions, or
privileges of employment.” There are also at least two kinds of harassment:
“quid pro quo” and “hostile work environment.” This means that there are
at least two paths to establish harassment, so that harassment is, at the very
least, not one claim with one set of elements.
The Supreme Court’s harassment cases to date are ones textually
supported under 42 U.S.C. § 2000e–2(a)(1). This is important for two
reasons. First, harassment jurisprudence derives from and is part of Title
VII’s main operative provision. It is not a stand-alone claim set forth in a
separate statutory provision. Second, the Supreme Court has not considered
what harassment theory might look like under 42 U.S.C. § 2000e–2(a)(2).
II.

HARASSMENT CLAIMS VERSUS TITLE VII CLAIMS

Thinking about harassment as a separate claim with elements, rather
than as one way to prove a violation of Title VII, has a number of
consequences. Overwhelmingly, courts and scholars use language that
perceives harassment as a separate claim.47 In the interest of full disclosure,
I have also used this language in articles, although I am trying to be more
careful about using the word “claim.” Here are some important implications
that follow from this framing choice, ranging from the procedural to the
theoretical.
A.

Procedural Issues

If harassment is a separate, stand-alone claim from other kinds of
discrimination, this directly impacts what a plaintiff must plead in the
complaint. The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure require the plaintiff to state
the claim and provide “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that
the pleader is entitled to relief.”48 Recent Supreme Court cases re-interpret
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8 to require the plaintiff to plead facts
sufficient to plausibly support the claim in the complaint.49 A judge may

47. See, e.g., Deters v. Rock-Tenn Co., 245 F. App’x 516, 521 (6th Cir. 2007); Mendoza
v. Borden, Inc., 195 F.3d 1238, 1242, 1244 (11th Cir. 1999); EEOC. v. G.F.B. Enters., LLC.,
No. 01-4035-CIV-SEITZ, 2002 WL 1908496, at *1 (S.D. Fla. June 20, 2002). See also Dallan
F. Flake, When Should Employers Be Liable for Factoring Biased Customer Feedback into
Employment Decisions?, 102 MINN. L. REV. 2169, 2215 (2018); Laura T. Kessler, Employm
ent Discrimination and the Domino Effect, 44 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 1041, 1066 (2017).
48. FED. R. CIV. P. 8(a)(2).
49. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009); Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S.
544, 570 (2007).
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properly dismiss the complaint under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
12(b)(6), if the plaintiff fails to meet the pleading requirement.50
Thinking of harassment as a separate, stand-alone claim means that
a plaintiff must use words that suggest harassment and plead facts supporting
harassment, even if the plaintiff’s complaint otherwise properly pleads other
types of discrimination. A court could dismiss the plaintiff’s harassment
“claim” in such a circumstance, even while allowing other “claims” of
discrimination to proceed. Consistent with this view of harassment as a
separate “claim,” courts often dismiss complaints alleging harassment if the
plaintiff fails to plead sufficient facts to support the “elements” of a
harassment “claim.”51
Likewise, if harassment is a separate claim, it would be appropriate
for a judge to refuse to consider such a claim at the summary judgment stage
or refuse to give jury instructions on such a claim, should the plaintiff not
plead the claim of harassment in her complaint.52 Some courts have
articulated harassment in such a way.53
Thinking of harassment as a stand-alone claim also has repercussions
related to administrative exhaustion. Prior to filing a Title VII claim in court,
a plaintiff must file a Charge of Discrimination (“Charge”) with the Equal
Employment Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”) or a comparable state
agency.54 If the plaintiff does not inform the EEOC of a claim, the plaintiff
may not later raise that claim in court unless the allegations are reasonably
related to the original charge.55 Courts have dismissed plaintiffs’ harassment
claims when plaintiffs submit sex-discrimination facts to the EEOC that do
not specifically mention acts of harassment.56 In these instances, the courts
seem to view harassment as a separate claim from other claims of
discrimination.
In contrast, if harassment is really a Title VII claim, then the plaintiff
should be able to proceed with a harassment claim even if her Charge does
50. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678.
51. See, e.g., Blomker v. Jewell, 831 F.3d 1051, 1061 (8th Cir. 2016); Edwards v. Prime,
Inc., 602 F.3d 1276, 1300 (11th Cir. 2010).
52. For examples of this phenomenon in another context, see Ginger v. District of
Columbia, 527 F.3d 1340, 1345 (D.C. Cir. 2008); see also Tobin v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 433
F.3d 100, 105 n.3 (1st Cir. 2005) (refusing to consider a motivating factor test on appeal);
EEOC v. Aldi, Inc., No. 06–01210, 2009 WL 3183077, at *12 (W.D. Pa. Sept. 30, 2009).
53. See, e.g., Mason v. S. Ill. Univ. at Carbondale, 233 F.3d 1036, 1044 (7th Cir. 2000)
(refusing to instruct jury on “claim” of co-worker harassment where plaintiff only asserted
“claim” of harassment by a supervisor).
54. 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e-5(b) (West 2012).
55. Evans v. Techs. Applications & Serv. Co., 80 F.3d 954, 962–63 (4th Cir. 1996).
56. See, e.g., id. at 963; see also Cheek v. W. & S. Life Ins. Co., 31 F.3d 497, 503 (7th
Cir. 1994) (“[O]rdinarily, a claim of sexual harassment cannot be reasonably inferred from
allegations in an EEOC charge of sexual discrimination.”); Callahan v. Univ. of Cent. Mo.,
No. 12-0281-CV-W-HFS, 2013 WL 796560, at *3 (W.D. Mo. Mar. 4, 2013) (dismissing age
harassment claims even though plaintiff specifically mentioned that the terms of her
employment were altered); Alston v. U-Haul Co. of Kan., No. 06-2403-CM, 2007 WL
1412672, at *2 (D. Kan. May 10, 2007).
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not separately delineate harassment. For example, the EEOC has a form
Charge.57 On the form, there are boxes where complainants can check the
type of discrimination faced. Complainants may check boxes for one or more
protected classes and for retaliation. There is no separate box for a plaintiff
to check for harassment. Complainants are also asked to provide the dates of
the alleged misconduct.
In most cases, if a plaintiff (1) alleges sex discrimination, (2) claims
that her sex negatively impacted the terms or conditions of her employment,
and (3) notes the appropriate date range in her Charge, she should be allowed
to later raise sexual harassment facts, even without mentioning harassment
specifically. In most cases, the facts supporting the harassment are
reasonably related to the stated allegations because all of the facts are part of
the same claim: the one claim for discrimination.
Likewise, the plaintiff would only need to submit a complaint
asserting a violation of Title VII, without any specific reference to
harassment. The plaintiff’s complaint would then need to contain facts to
provide notice to the defendant that the plaintiff could establish the broader
contours of Title VII. If the plaintiff wants to have her facts analyzed under
the harassment rubric, she could provide facts to support such a theory in her
complaint, but she would not be required to do so. As long as the plaintiff
could prevail under any framework cognizable under Title VII, her claim
should be allowed to proceed upon a challenge under Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 12(b)(6). As discussed in the following section, the Supreme
Court has recognized that a plaintiff need not select at the pleading stage the
particular theory upon which she will later proceed.58
Additionally, as long as the plaintiff properly responds to discovery
requests about alleged harassment, the plaintiff should be allowed to assert
harassment facts at the summary judgment and trial phases, without
separately pleading harassment in the complaint.59 Again, the idea is that
harassment is not a separate claim with separate elements, but rather part of
the broader concept of discrimination under Title VII.
57. Note that the EEOC “Charge of Discrimination” form contains no mention of the
word “harassment,” and harassment is not listed on the form as a separate type of
discrimination. EQUAL EMP’T OPPORTUNITY COMM., EEOC FORM 5: CHARGE OF DISCRIMIN
ATION (2009), https://www.eeoc.gov/eeoc/foia/forms/upload/form_5.pdf [https://perma.cc/
V8R9-UNRJ].
58. Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N. A., 534 U.S. 506, 508 (2002).
59. Scholarship supports the proposition that the discovery phase, rather than the
complaint and motion-to-dismiss phase, performs a more central function in litigation,
especially when complex arguments are presented with various theories and factual scenarios
that require additional fact-finding. See Suzanne B. Goldberg, Risky Arguments in SocialJustice Litigation: The Case of Sex Discrimination and Marriage Equality, 114 COLUM. L.
REV. 2087, 2101 n.39 (2014) (“Complaints often present a reduced version of a complex
argument . . . [and] provide a framework for discovery. After the motion-to-dismiss phase . . .
, the complaint is typically no longer the centerpiece of the litigation; focus turns instead to
evidence gained through discovery and to the lawyers’ briefs and elaborated arguments in
subsequent motions.”).
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Substantive and Theoretical Issues

Outside of the procedural context, the differences between
harassment as part of Title VII, and harassment as a stand-alone claim, have
enormous substantive and theoretical consequences.
1.

Separating Theories of Discrimination and Worker Choice

Professor Laura Kessler has urged courts and scholars to consider
the interplay between bias, structural discrimination, and worker choice in
producing unequal outcomes in the workplace.60 In her article, Employment
Discrimination and the Domino Effect, she presents a lengthy hypothetical
about a female professor who is granted tenure, but who does not apply for
full professor.61 The hypothetical begins with the junior professor avoiding
an important male colleague in her department after he invited her to dinner
while emphasizing that his wife was out of town. The same male professor
also places his hands on her shoulder while they stand in the buffet line at a
weekly faculty lunch. Although it is unclear whether this conduct would
meet the “severe or pervasive” standard under Title VII, Professor Kessler
argues that the combined effect of this early behavior with later incidents of
bias, structural barriers, and employee choice yield unequal outcomes
between the female professor and male colleagues with respect to promotion
to full professor.
At the same time, Professor Kessler notes that courts have been
reluctant to allow plaintiffs to combine harassment claims based on
sexualized conduct with other kinds of disparate treatment.62 For example,
in the prior hypothetical, imagine that the male colleague’s unwarranted
dinner invitation and touching at the buffet line causes the female professor
to avoid that faculty member, who is an important person in her field.
Imagine that when she applied for tenure, another male colleague peerreviewed her teaching and noted that “she seemed distracted because she
must be spending too much time caring for her newborn baby.” This negative
evaluation went into her file. Even though the professor received tenure, she
was rated as “good,” rather than “excellent.”
If we assume that harassment is a different claim from disparate
treatment (as courts often do), the court will separately analyze the dinner
invitation and buffet-line touching from the negative evaluation. It is unlikely
that the dinner invitation and buffet-line massages will meet the severe or
pervasive requirement, and so the court will dismiss that “claim.” The court
may even forbid the plaintiff from raising any evidence related to this
conduct in support of her case. Even though this early conduct relates to the
later negative outcome, categorizing harassment as a stand-alone claim may
60. Kessler, supra note 47, at 1050.
61. Id. at 1060–65.
62. Id. at 1066.
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cause the courts to disallow the plaintiff from connecting the harassing
behavior with the plaintiff’s failure to become a full professor.
Shortly after the Supreme Court recognized harassment, Professor
Vicki Schultz showed how courts had difficulty recognizing non-sexualized
harassment as a cognizable harm.63 Professor Schultz also noted how courts
had difficulty recognizing a unified claim against the employer when a
plaintiff alleged that one person engaged in sexual conduct toward her, while
another person engaged in non-sexual harassment.64 In addition, she
discussed how courts tended to evaluate non-sexual acts and comments under
the rubric of disparate treatment, while evaluating sexual speech and
comments under the harassment frame.65
Professors Schultz and Kessler correctly describe and theorize many
of the problems with how the courts conceive of harassment. This Article
asserts that some of these problems derive from a procedural ambiguity:
viewing harassment as a separate, stand-alone claim. As discussed in more
detail throughout this Article, if one views Title VII as the claim itself (rather
than harassment), there is more flexibility for the cause of action to be
provable under different theories and evidentiary patterns, especially as we
gain a better understanding of how and why inequality exists in the
workplace. Moreover, there is greater flexibility for judges and juries to find
that new types of factual scenarios viably establish that a person faced
discrimination on the basis of a protected trait. The choice of civil-procedure
language about what constitutes a claim, and what does not, has enormous
impacts on the substantive and theoretical framing of cases involving
harassment.
2.

Slicing and Dicing Within the Harassment Paradigm

Under Title VII jurisprudence, the courts recognize different factual
scenarios that will lead to liability under the general rubric of harassment,
including “quid pro quo,” harassing conduct that culminates in an adverse
action, and harassing conduct that does not result in an adverse action.66 As
discussed in the cases below, some courts appear to view each of these as a
separate “claim” with “separate elements.”
One of the substantive consequences that may result from seeing
these factual scenarios as separate “claims” is the phenomenon that the late

63. Schultz, Reconceptualizing Sexual Harassment, supra note 1, at 1689; see also
Vicki Schultz, Reconceptualizing Sexual Harassment, Again, 128 YALE L.J.F. 22, 24 (2018)
(discussing how the #MeToo movement also often focuses on sexualized harassment).
64. Schultz, Reconceptualizing Sexual Harassment, supra note 1, at 1701–05.
65. Id. at 1714.
66. See, e.g., Burlington Indus., Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742, 751–54 (1998); Bowman
v. Shawnee State Univ., 220 F.3d 456, 461 n.4 (6th Cir. 2000). Courts have been inconsistent
in their use of the words “tangible employment action” and adverse action in describing the
required “elements” for harassment that culminates in an adverse action.
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Professor Michael Zimmer calls “slicing and dicing.”67 When a judge slices
and dices the facts of a case, the judge subdivides the evidence into multiple
claims and only considers the evidence for each claim in isolation, failing to
put the evidence together to tell a more complete story about what is actually
happening in the workplace.
In some instances, the slicing and dicing causes alleged
discriminatory acts to disappear. Take the following example. In one case,
a plaintiff alleged that a supervisor harassed him because of his sex, and that
the supervisor temporarily reassigned him to another position as part of the
harassment.68 A court might view this as a claim for harassing conduct that
culminates in an adverse action.69 However, the court might find as a matter
of law that removing the plaintiff from a job temporarily does not meet the
adverse action requirement because it is temporary. The court might then
dismiss the “claim” for harassment that culminates in an adverse action.
Given the lack of an adverse action, the court may then consider
whether the plaintiff has a “claim” for harassment that does not result in an
adverse action.70 The court will consider whether the conduct is “severe or
pervasive.”71 In doing so, it will omit the temporary loss of the position from
the list of items that support the plaintiff’s allegations that he faced severe or
pervasive conduct. This allegation simply disappears from the second
“claim” because the court does not view it as an adverse action and does not
otherwise view it as harassment.
In other cases, the court may refuse to draw causal connections
between events and outcomes that the court considers to fall within different
“causes of action.” For example, in one case a woman alleged that her
supervisor repeatedly insinuated that her tenure and advancement with a
company would be enhanced if she engaged in a sexual relationship with
him. The woman claimed the following:
[The plaintiff] asserts that, after she was hired, [the
supervisor] persistently showed her an unusual amount of
attention of a sexual nature, including frequently staring at
her breasts, genitals, and legs while praising her
“performance” and offering her raises. She alleges that [he]
also engaged in numerous unwelcome sexual advances,
including, on one occasion, rubbing her neck and shoulders
and resting the heel of his hands on her shoulders with his
fingertips just above the tops of her breasts; asking her if she
had watched a James Bond movie involving a secretary
67. Michael J. Zimmer, Slicing & Dicing of Individual Disparate Treatment Law, 61
LA. L. REV. 577, 584 (2001).
68. For a case with similar allegations, see generally Bowman, 220 F.3d at 461.
69. Id.
70. Id. at 462.
71. Id.
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named Money Penny who had a sexual relationship with her
boss; offering her raises and other benefits, including
overtime pay, company day care, and travel, at the same time
asking her to meet him privately and socially after regular
working hours or in his office on the weekends for drinks;
“stalking” or following her around Fort Dodge; and showing
inappropriate attention to or asking inappropriate questions
about her personal and social life, including whether she had
a boyfriend who would be angry if she met [him] after
work.72
This worker alleged that because of this conduct, she (1) avoided
taking overtime opportunities where fewer people would be in the office, (2)
avoided the supervisor at work, and (3) eventually took a medical leave due
to emotional distress.73 The total time span of the alleged conduct, including
the medical leave, was little more than a year.74 The company disputed many
of the allegations.
In ruling on summary judgment in this case, the court held that all of
these allegations were relevant to a hostile environment claim; however, the
court found them to be too remote in time to be relevant to a constructive
discharge claim.75 The plaintiff’s case was allowed to proceed; however, the
court held there was no constructive discharge.76 The court perceived
“hostile work environment,” “quid pro quo,” and the constructive discharge
to be three separate claims that each required different sets of evidence.77
Conceptual problems also arise when a plaintiff alleges harassing
conduct, but the court does not believe that the conduct rises to the level of a
request for sexual favors. Imagine a case in which a worker alleges that her
supervisor did the following:
She testifies that she told [him] not to touch her after he
touched her on the shoulder down the middle of her back.
This is the only instance of physical conduct alleged and the
only instance she allegedly acknowledged his “advances.”
She states that [the supervisor] called her pretty, said she had
a girly body, wore sexy jeans, alluded that she smelled like
soap, alluded that she might gain weight, commented that

72. EEOC v. Am. Home Prods. Corp., No. C 00-3079-MWB, 2001 WL 34008505, at
*2 (N.D. Iowa Dec. 21, 2001).
73. Id.
74. Id.
75. Id. at *11.
76. Id.
77. Id. at *1, *11.
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[she] walked passed without speaking, and stared at her.
[She] states she ignored his comments and staring.78
The plaintiff then alleged that she was falsely accused of
insubordination and the company fired her.79 The company contested the
plaintiff’s allegations and evidence supporting the allegations.80
In this case, the court dismissed the plaintiff’s “quid pro quo” claim
because it found that the plaintiff could not establish that the supervisor’s
behavior amounted to a request for sexual favors.81 Thus, the court
recognized “quid pro quo” as a separate “claim” from “hostile work
environment” that required the plaintiff to establish a separate set of elements
to proceed. What is odd is that a court would be comfortable in making these
kinds of value-based judgments about the intended effect of the behavior.
The Court did not view the comments about the women’s body or the looks
as part of a possible quid pro quo. Viewing “quid pro quo” as a separate
“claim” with certain required elements (i.e., a request for sexual favors)
invites this kind of inquiry.
However, it should be noted that this state of affairs is not dictated
by the text of Title VII, but rather how the courts have inartfully divided
harassment into separate “claims.” The question Title VII asks is whether a
plaintiff faced a different outcome because of her sex or other protected trait.
The text clearly allows the woman to combine instances of harassment from
seemingly separate instances of disparate treatment. These are not separate
“claims,” under Title VII’s text. And, the text of Title VII places liability at
the employer, and not the individual, level.82 There is no textual barrier to
aggregating all actions that occur under one employer within the time frames
allowed for bringing claims under the statute.83
Thinking about Title VII as a general cause of action may induce
both judges and factfinders to view the facts more holistically because they
are not looking at the evidence through narrow silos, but rather through the
broader lens of the statutory language of Title VII.
3.

Damages

The court’s use of the term “claim” also has important implications
for damages. Courts recognize that harassing conduct can culminate in an

78. Gilliam v. Berkeley Contract Packaging, LLC, No. 12-cv-1174-DRH-SCW, 2014
WL 2927023, at *5 (S.D. Ill. June 27, 2014).
79. Id.
80. Id. at *2.
81. Id. at *5.
82. 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e-2(a) (West 2012).
83. Work is needed to reconcile this underlying set of facts and issues of employer
liability. See Burlington Indus. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742 (1998); Faragher v. City of Boca
Raton, 524 U.S. 775 (1998).
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adverse action.84 For example, imagine a plaintiff has a supervisor who uses
highly derogatory language on four occasions over a year stating that women
would not make good managers. The plaintiff is qualified for a managerial
position and applies for the job, but the supervisor chooses a less qualified
male candidate for the manager position.
In such a case, the woman faces harm over the year-long period in
which her supervisor makes these comments. She faces uncertainty about
whether the supervisor will judge her fairly in any future decisions. She faces
the dilemma of whether to complain about the comments and possibly face
workplace retaliation for the report. Given the current state of retaliation law,
if she complains too early, she may not be protected against retaliation.85
Now imagine a second case. A supervisor does not make any of the
comments to the plaintiff. Instead, at the time of promotion, he simply hires
a less qualified male candidate over the plaintiff. There is evidence he did
not hire the plaintiff because of her sex, but the plaintiff does not know about
it until after the supervisor makes the promotion decision.
In both cases, a woman faced discrimination because of a protected
trait. Let’s assume that both women suffered the same amount of emotional
distress from the failure to promote. However, a question arises about
whether the plaintiff in the first case could seek damages for the comments
made before the promotion decision, if she could establish that the comments
caused her emotional distress. It seems that the answer should be yes, given
that the harassing comments and the failure to promote both harmed the
plaintiff, and taken together, they meet Title VII’s threshold for harm to the
“terms, conditions, or privileges of [the plaintiff’s] employment.”
Yet, such an outcome appears to be at odds with the idea that
harassment is a separate claim. Indeed in Ellerth, the Supreme Court noted:
When a plaintiff proves that a tangible employment action
resulted from a refusal to submit to a supervisor’s sexual
demands, he or she establishes that the employment decision
itself constitutes a change in the terms and conditions of
employment that is actionable under Title VII. For any
sexual harassment preceding the employment decision to be
actionable, however, the conduct must be severe or
pervasive. Because Ellerth’s claim involves only unfulfilled
threats, it should be categorized as a hostile work
environment claim which requires a showing of severe or
pervasive conduct.86

84. See Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 761 (listing examples of materially adverse actions).
85. Deborah L. Brake, Retaliation, 90 MINN. L. REV. 18, 78–79 (2005).
86. Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 753–54 (1998); see also Lowe v. Am. Eurocopter, LLC, No.
1:10CV24-A-D, 2010 WL 5232523, at *9 (N.D. Miss. Dec. 16, 2010) (reasoning that the
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Viewing harassment as a claim (or set of claims) with separate
elements that is distinct from other claims under Title VII contributes to
numerous problems. It creates unnecessary procedural hurdles to harassment
and creates questions about damages.87 It makes it more likely that courts
will disaggregate harassment from other discrimination facts.88 Courts may
even disaggregate different kinds of harassment from one another, carefully
slicing the “claims” of “quid pro quo,” “hostile environment” that culminates
in an adverse action, and hostile environment that does not culminate in an
adverse action. Courts may also separate the actions of different actors,
separating the harassing conduct of some actors from the otherwise
discriminatory conduct of others. Further, courts may separate all of this
conduct from other dynamics that create inequality, like structural
discrimination.
III.

PROCEDURAL AMBIGUITY

If viewing harassment as a claim distorts discrimination law, it is
worth considering whether harassment is a stand-alone claim. For the past
several decades, the Supreme Court has been adjudicating procedurally
ambiguous cases and then resolving those procedural ambiguities in ways
that contest the dominant procedural paradigm being used at the time by the
lower courts. The procedural ambiguity that we see in harassment cases is
part of a broader jurisprudential picture. Consistent with this broader picture,
it is likely that the dominant paradigm is both unintentional and can easily be
changed or clarified.
The most prominent example of this happened in Swierkiewicz v.
Sorema N. A.89 In that case, the Supreme Court addressed similar (although
not identical) confusion about what constitutes a “claim” under Title VII. In
Swierkiewicz,90 the Supreme Court considered whether a court may dismiss
a plaintiff’s complaint if the plaintiff fails to plead sufficient facts to support
each of the factors of the McDonnell Douglas prima facie case.91
In 1973, the Supreme Court first developed a test called McDonnell
Douglas that courts use to analyze some (but not all) individual disparate
treatment discrimination cases.92 The test begins with a multi-part first step,
called the prima facie case. In McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, the
Supreme Court held that the plaintiff can establish the prima facie case by
showing the following:

plaintiff must separately establish the severe or pervasive element for pre-termination
conduct).
87. See discussion supra Sections II.B.2–3.
88. See discussion supra Section II.B.2.
89. Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N.A., 534 U.S. 506, 508 (2002).
90. Id.
91. Id.
92. McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802 (1973).
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(i) that he belongs to a racial minority; (ii) that he applied
and was qualified for a job for which the employer was
seeking applicants; (iii) that, despite his qualifications, he
was rejected; and (iv) that, after his rejection, the position
remained open and the employer continued to seek
applicants from persons of complainant’s qualifications.93
The Supreme Court cautioned, however, that the facts required to
establish a prima facie case will necessarily vary, depending on the factual
scenario of the underlying case.94 The Supreme Court has stated on
numerous occasions that the prima facie case is not supposed to be onerous.95
After the plaintiff establishes this prima facie case, a rebuttable
presumption of discrimination arises.96 The analysis then proceeds to the
second step of McDonnell Douglas. After a plaintiff makes a prima facie
showing, the burden of production shifts to the employer to articulate some
legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for the allegedly discriminatory
decision or action, thereby rebutting the presumption.97 In the third step, the
plaintiff is then provided the opportunity to show that the employer’s stated
reason for the employment action was pretext, or other evidence that shows
that the employee’s protected trait played a role in the outcome.98
In Swierkiewicz, the United States Court of Appeals for the Second
Circuit treated the McDonnell Douglas test as if the test comprised elements
of a claim.99 The idea that McDonnell Douglas states the elements of a claim
was infused throughout the jurisprudence at this time.100 From that
assumption, the Second Circuit found it proper to dismiss the plaintiff’s claim
based on a failure to plead and properly support those elements.101
However, the Supreme Court held that the McDonnell Douglas
prima facie case does not represent the elements of a Title VII claim.102
Instead, it explained:
The prima facie case under McDonnell Douglas, however,
is an evidentiary standard, not a pleading requirement.
In McDonnell Douglas, this Court made clear that “[t]he
critical issue before us concern[ed] the order and
93. Id.
94. Id. at 802–03.
95. See, e.g., Young v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., 135 S.Ct. 1338, 1354 (2015); Tex.
Dep’t of Cmty. Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 253 (1981).
96. O’Connor v. Consol. Coin Caterers Corp., 517 U.S. 308, 311–12 (1996).
97. Id. at 311.
98. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 411 U.S. at 804.
99. Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N. A., 534 U.S. 506, 510 (2002).
100. Id. (noting that the Second Circuit applied circuit precedent in requiring the plaintiff
to plead a prima facie case of discrimination under McDonnell Douglas in order to survive a
motion to dismiss).
101. Id. at 509.
102. Id. at 510.
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allocation of proof in a private, non-class action challenging
employment discrimination.” In subsequent cases, this Court
has reiterated that the prima facie case relates to the
employee’s burden of presenting evidence that raises an
inference of discrimination. See Tex. Dep’t of Cmty. Affairs
v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 252-53 (1981) (“In [McDonnell
Douglas,] we set forth the basic allocation of burdens and
order of presentation of proof in a Title VII case alleging
discriminatory treatment.)103
Swierkiewicz demonstrates that even though courts describe an
analytical structure as a claim and treat it as a claim for decades, the thenexisting structure may not represent a claim at all. As the Court noted in
Swierkiewicz, there are many ways for a plaintiff to prove that he faced
discrimination under Title VII. One of those ways is through the McDonnell
Douglas framework. However, the plaintiff can prevail through different
iterations of McDonnell Douglas and the plaintiff can also prevail without
proceeding through McDonnell Douglas at all.104 Additionally, the plaintiff
is not required to choose whether to use McDonnell Douglas at the pleading
stage, but can wait to choose her proof structure until she obtains discovery,
as long as she presents sufficient facts to support a Title VII claim.105
This same problem with characterizing a proof structure too strictly
also has occurred at the circuit-court level. In Ortiz v. Werner Enterprises,
Inc., the Seventh Circuit held that a plaintiff may prevail on a discrimination
claim through either a direct method or an indirect method.106 The Court
further held that a plaintiff could prevail under the direct method by showing
a convincing mosaic of circumstantial evidence. However, the Seventh
Circuit recently retracted the convincing mosaic framework, in part, because
judges were improperly transforming the convincing mosaic framework into
required elements of a “claim.”107 As the Seventh Circuit noted, “The district
court treated each method as having its own elements and rules, even though
we have held that they are just means to consider whether one fact (here,
ethnicity) caused another (here, discharge) and therefore are not ‘elements’
of any claim.”108
The Seventh Circuit also noted that even though it had tried to warn
courts not to treat the convincing mosaic test as the “elements” of a “claim,”
its admonitions did not work.109 Importantly, the Seventh Circuit itself

103. Id. (citation omitted).
104. Id. at 511–12.
105. Id.
106. Ortiz v. Werner Enters., Inc., 834 F.3d 760, 765 (7th Cir. 2016).
107. Id. at 764–65.
108. Id. at 763.
109. Id. at 764.
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lapsed into language that categorized the convincing mosaic framework as a
legal requirement.110 The Seventh Circuit noted:
Today we reiterate that “convincing mosaic” is not a legal
test. We overrule the opinions in the previous paragraph to
the extent that they rely on “convincing mosaic” as a
governing legal standard. We do not hold that any of those
cases was wrongly decided; our concern is only with the
treatment of “convincing mosaic” as if it were a legal
requirement. From now on, any decision of a district court
that treats this phrase as a legal requirement in an
employment-discrimination case is subject to summary
reversal, so that the district court can evaluate the evidence
under the correct standard.
That legal standard, to repeat what we wrote in Achor and
many later cases, is simply whether the evidence would
permit a reasonable factfinder to conclude that the plaintiff’s
race, ethnicity, sex, religion, or other proscribed factor
caused the discharge or other adverse employment action.
Evidence must be considered as a whole, rather than asking
whether any particular piece of evidence proves the case by
itself—or whether just the “direct” evidence does so, or the
“indirect” evidence. Evidence is evidence. Relevant
evidence must be considered and irrelevant evidence
disregarded, but no evidence should be treated differently
from other evidence because it can be labeled “direct” or
“indirect.”111
Like Swierkiewicz, Ortiz demonstrates that courts often use language
that suggests an employment discrimination test or analytical structure
represents the “elements” of a “claim,” when this is not accurate. Ortiz
emphasizes that the cause of action is a Title VII claim and that all evidence
of discrimination should be considered together.112
Another Supreme Court case, University of Texas Southwestern
Medical Center v. Nassar, offers an additional example of procedural
ambiguity.113 In the 1989 case of Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, the Supreme
Court interpreted Title VII as allowing a plaintiff to prevail by establishing
that a protected trait operated as a motivating factor in an employment
outcome.114
110. Id.
111. Id. at 765.
112. Id.
113. See Univ. of Tex. Sw. Med. Ctr. v. Nassar, 570 U.S. 338 (2013).
114. Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 241–42 (1989).
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In 1991, Congress amended Title VII115 by adding § 2000e–2(m) to
the statute. That section provides that a plaintiff may prevail under Title VII
by establishing that a protected trait was a motivating factor in an
employment decision.116 Congress also created an affirmative defense,
which, if proven, would be a partial defense to damages.117
Even though the text of Title VII did not use the terms “mixedmotive,” courts began referring to § 2000e–2(m) as establishing a “mixedmotive” claim.118 Some courts distinguished these “mixed-motive” claims
from what the courts called the “single-motive” claim provided under the
statute’s main language in § 2000e–2(a).
In Nassar, the Supreme Court held the following: “For one thing,
§ 2000e–2(m) is not itself a substantive bar on discrimination. Rather, it is a
rule that establishes the causation standard for proving a violation defined
elsewhere in Title VII.”119 Nassar clarified that the underlying claim was a
violation of Title VII.120 A plaintiff may prove that claim through many
different paths.121 The plaintiff can use McDonnell Douglas prima facie
test.122 The plaintiff can also use the causation language found in § 2000e–
2(m).123
Similarly, the courts have been inaccurate when they use other civilprocedure language, such as language related to burdens of production and
burdens of persuasion.124 For example, there have been decades of confusion
about how the burdens of production and persuasion work at each step in the
McDonnell Douglas test. 125
As these cases show, the courts have, for decades, regularly and
incorrectly, used terms like “claim” and “element.” A later case may then
radically change the legal landscape by rejecting the idea that a particular test
represents the elements of a claim.

115. 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e-2(m) (West 2006).
116. Id.
117. Id. at § 2000e-5(g)(2)(B) (West 2006).
118. See, e.g., Porter v. Natsios, 414 F.3d 13, 19 (D.C. Cir. 2005).
119. Univ. of Tex. Sw. Med. Ctr. v. Nassar, 570 U.S. 338, 355 (2013).
120. Id.
121. See generally Alex B. Long, Retaliation Backlash, 93 WASH. L. REV. 715, 719–23
(2018) (listing methods of proving Title VII claims).
122. See McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802–04 (1973) (laying out
the burden-shifting framework).
123. The Supreme Court has not clarified how and whether 42 U.S.C.A § 2000e2(m)(West 2012) and McDonnell Douglas intersect with one another.
124. See Meacham v. Knolls Atomic Power Lab., 554 U.S. 84, 91–93 (2008) (similar
problem in ADEA disparate impact context in characterizing burdens of production and
persuasion); Tex. Dep’t of Cmty. Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 255–56 (1981); see also
Smith v. City of Jackson, 544 U.S. 228 (2005).
125. See St. Mary’s Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502, 508–10 (1993) (holding that while
the factfinder’s rejection of the employer’s proffered reason permits the factfinder to infer
discrimination, it does not compel such a finding); Burdine, 450 U.S. at 256.
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HARASSMENT AS FACTS SUPPORTING A TITLE VII CLAIM

The prior section shows that the Supreme Court often interprets Title
VII in procedurally ambiguous ways. The lower courts often respond to this
procedural ambiguity by choosing one of the possible routes. At times, the
Supreme Court has returned to the procedural ambiguity and resolved it in
ways that upset the dominant paradigm.
In some instances, the courts’ ambiguous language relates to whether
certain facts constitute a “cause of action” with required “elements.” The
Supreme Court has twice demolished the dominant procedural paradigm
created by the inexact language surrounding “claim” and “element.” The
Supreme Court (in Swierkiewicz and Nassar) and the Seventh Circuit in
Ortiz, both emphasized that the overall claim is a Title VII claim, and a
plaintiff may prove that claim using different procedural methods and
evidentiary paths.
Applying these lessons in the context of Title VII provides a roadmap
for convincing courts that the current dynamic of treating harassment as a
separate claim is incorrect. As discussed earlier, it is not clear that the
Supreme Court meant to crystallize harassment as a separate claim.
Although it used some “claim” language, it has also repeatedly emphasized
that harassment is part of a larger Title VII claim.
Rather than thinking about harassment as a separate claim, it is more
accurate to state that in Meritor and Harris, the Supreme Court was merely
offering examples of some types of conduct that would satisfy (a)(1)’s
language that the unlawful employment practice affects the “terms,
conditions, or privileges of employment.”126 When doing so, the Court did
not provide a complete list of all of the factual situations that would reach
such a level.127 Nor did it say that harassing acts and other discriminatory
acts were separate and could not be considered together when thinking about
whether the plaintiff could cross the required harm threshold.128
Thinking about harassment in this way can clarify many of the
procedural issues discussed in Section III. Title VII is the claim. Plaintiff is
not required to separately plead a count or a claim called “harassment,”
126. 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e-2(a)(1) (West 2012).
127. See Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 22 (1993) (“The appalling conduct
alleged in Meritor . . . merely present[s] some especially egregious examples of harassment.
[It does] not mark the boundary of what is actionable.”); Meritor Sav. Bank v. Vinson, 477
U.S. 57, 66 (1986) (noting that “‘terms, conditions, or privileges of employment’ in [Title VII]
is an expansive concept which sweeps within its protective ambit the practice of creating a
working environment heavily charged with ethnic or racial discrimination” (quoting Rogers
v. EEOC, 454 F.2d 234, 238 (1971)).
128. See Harris, 510 U.S. at 23 (“[W]e can say that whether an environment is ‘hostile’
or ‘abusive’ can be determined only by looking at all the circumstances. These may include
the frequency of the discriminatory conduct; its severity; whether it is physically threatening
or humiliating, or a mere offensive utterance; and whether it unreasonably interferes with an
employee’s work performance.” (emphasis added)).
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although the plaintiff may do so, if she chooses.129 As long as the plaintiff
has given appropriate notice in the complaint and properly responded to
discovery, the plaintiff may prevail on any set of facts that establishes
liability under Title VII.130
A plaintiff should be able to aggregate all harms that occur with the
same employer to meet Title VII’s required harm threshold, whether they are
perpetrated by one individual, a small group of connected individuals, or a
group of unconnected individuals.131 The plaintiff can also show how
policies and structures impacted employment. The key question under
section (a)(1) is whether the plaintiff faced certain negative employment
outcomes or was “otherwise . . . discriminate[d] against . . . with respect to
his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because
of such individual’s race, color, religion, sex, or national origin[.]”132 Title
VII focuses liability at the employer level.133
By thinking of harassment in this way, we can open up section (a)(2)
as an option for exploring it . Courts often narrow harassment by focusing on
a single victim and a single perpetrator or small group of perpetrators. In her
recent essay, Professor Tristin K. Green ponders whether recognizing sexual
harassment as a separate form of discrimination is a mistake.134 Professor
Green argues,
Sexual harassment is a form of discrimination because more
often than not it is tied to broader inequality in the
workplace. But our law has not embraced this reality.
Instead, the existing law of harassment constrains
permissible narratives on both sides. On the victim side, it
rewards thinking of ourselves and our experiences of
harassment in isolation, when we might instead see our
experiences as members of groups embedded within broader
environments. On the perpetrator side, it asks whether a
specific, identified harasser engaged in acts of harassment,
thereby ignoring others in the organization and the
organizational structure itself as causes of ongoing hostile
environments.135

129. See, e.g., Bowman v. Shawnee State Univ., 220 F.3d 456, 460 (6th Cir. 2000).
130. See discussion supra Section III.
131. See, e.g., Smith v. Rosebud Farm, Inc., 898 F.3d 747, 749 (7th Cir. 2018); Stella v.
Mineta, 284 F.3d 135, 139–40 (D.C. Cir. 2002); Bowman, 220 F.3d at 458–59.
132. 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e-2(a)(1) (West 2012).
133. Id. at § 2000e-2(a) (West 2012) (“It shall be an unlawful employment practice for
an employer—”) (emphasis added).
134. Tristin K. Green, Was Sexual Harassment Law a Mistake? The Stories We Tell, 128
Y ALE L.J.F. 152 (2018).
135. Id. at 153.
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Professor Green properly criticizes the Supreme Court’s test as
focusing too much on identifying conduct directed at an individual and for
preventing plaintiffs from pursuing “a collective claim, and thereby more
easily present[ing] a collective story.”136
While this individualized focus is embedded in the contemporary
harassment doctrine, it need not be so if courts and litigants can reframe
harassment as one type of harm that is connected to other types of harmful
discrimination. The language of Title VII’s second operative provision
provides for a more expansive view of harassing behavior. That language
makes it unlawful for an employer:
(2) to limit, segregate, or classify his employees or
applicants for employment in any way which would deprive
or tend to deprive any individual of employment
opportunities or otherwise adversely affect his status as an
employee, because of such individual’s race, color, religion,
sex, or national origin.137
To date, the courts have not considered what harassment might look
like under section (a)(2). They have framed harassment as a “claim” that is
derivative of section (a)(1).138 However, by viewing harassment as being a
theory of harm under the larger umbrella of Title VII, it becomes clearer that
harassment litigants can argue for broader conceptions of discrimination
under section (a)(2).
For example, the provision in section (a)(2) prevents employment
practices that “deprive or tend to deprive” a person of employment
opportunities or “otherwise adversely affect his status as an employee.”139
This language does not rely on the “terms, conditions, or privileges of
employment language.”140 In the prior hypothetical involving the female
professor, the professor should be able to argue that her employment
opportunities were “adversely affect[ed]” by her colleagues’ actions.
Additionally, because the language includes practices that “tend to
deprive”141 an employee of opportunities, people should be able to pull
together the collective experience of other employees in the protected class
and demonstrate how those experiences affected the plaintiff. For example,
if women in a department are routinely harassed and passed over for
136. Id. at 162.
137. 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e-2(a) (West 2012).
138. See, e.g., Smith v. Rosebud Farm, Inc., 898 F.3d 747, 750 (7th Cir. 2018) (“Title
VII does not impose a flat ban on all harassment. . . . It prohibits harassment that discriminates
against an individual ‘because of such individual’s . . . sex.’” (citing 42 U.S.C. § 2000e2(a)(1))).
139. 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e-2(a)(2) (West 2012).
140. Compare 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e-2(a)(1) (West 2012) with 42 U.S.C.A § 2000a2(a)(2).
141. Id. at § 2000e-2(a)(2) (West 2012).
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promotion, a plaintiff might be able to establish that her chance to be
promoted is affected by this environment, even if she is not a direct target of
harassment.
V.

CONCLUSION

Courts often characterize harassment as a separate claim with a
separate set of elements. This frame brings with it a number of procedural,
substantive, and theoretical consequences.
As this Article shows, it is more likely that when courts speak about
harassment as a “claim,” they are not overtly grappling with the
consequences that derive from this framing. As with other cases in the past,
it is likely that the Supreme Court’s early use of “claim” language was simply
inaccurate. Although this language has come to have a host of collateral
effects, it is not too late to correct the framing problem. Following the model
in Swierkiewicz and Nassar, the Supreme Court or lower courts can unwind
the damage done by this inartful use of civil-procedure language and
empower future plaintiffs to plead harassment within the larger ambit of Title
VII.

